Liberalisation and Hindutva: New Threats to National Unity

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Ideology

By the late 1890s, the term Hindutva was already in use. Chandranath Basu, who first used the term in 1892, and subsequently the national figure Bal Gangadhar Tilak, were the ones responsible for its adoption. In contrast to the political philosophy advocated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Basu’s use of the phrase was intended to simply depict a traditional Hindu cultural outlook. Savarkar, a right-wing nationalist and a leader in the Indian freedom struggle, came up with the word in 1923 when he was serving time in prison for conspiring against the British Raj and advocating violence against it. Savarkar popularised the term. According to W. J. Johnson, a scholar of religious studies who specialises in Hinduism, he used this term to outline his ideology and “the idea of a universal and essential Hindu identity,” where the phrase “Hindu identity” is broadly interpreted and distinguished from “ways of life and values of others.” He used this term to outline his ideology and “the idea of a universal and essential Hindu identity.” According to Chetan Bhatt, the present definition and usage of Hindutva stems in great part from Savarkar’s beliefs. Likewise, the post-1980s nationalism and mass political engagement in India also draws from Savarkar’s ideas. Jaffrelot contends that the Hindutva ideology as it is described in Savarkar’s works “clearly depicts” an endeavour to construct one’s identity by “stigmatising and emulating the behaviours of those who endanger others.” In particular, he thought that the Hindus were susceptible because of pan-Islamism and other such “Pan-isms,” and he wrote about this assumption:

According to Prabhu Bapu, a historian and scholar of Oriental Studies, the term and the contextual meaning of Hindutva emerged from the Indian experience during the colonial era, memories of its religious wars as the Mughal Empire decayed, an era of Muslim and Christian proselytization, a feeling that their traditions and cultures were being insulted, whereby the Hindu intellectuals formulated Hindutva as a “Hindu identity” as a prelude to a national

Confirming its narrative of geographical and cultural nationalism based on Indian culture and religions, the rise of “religious nationalism” and the demand by Muslim leaders on the Indian subcontinent for the partition of British India into Muslim and non-Muslim nations during the first half of the 20th century both occurred during this time period. 

Soon after that, he paid Savarkar a visit in Ratnagiri, where they had a conversation about different strategies for organising the “Hindu nation.” Discussions between Savarkar and Hedgewar in September of that year led to Hedgewar establishing the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, lit. “National Volunteer Society”) with the intention of achieving this goal. This organisation became the most prominent Hindu nationalist movement in a short amount of time thanks to its quick expansion. However, the ideology of the new organisation was not initially referred to as Hindutva; rather, it was referred to as Hindu Rashtra, which literally translates to “Hindu nation.” In fact, a publication produced by the RSS stated that “it became evident that Hindus were the nation in Bharat and that Hindutva was Rashtriyatva [nationalism].”

Conclusion

This chapter investigates the difficulties that befell India’s national unity in the years following 1947, paying particular attention to the country’s most remote areas in the north-west and the north-east. The article, which was published in 2010, argued against an optimistic view that suggested the political control of these areas may begin to decrease in political relevance in India. It said that there was a significant degree of continuity between the ways in which the BJP and the Congress controlled certain regions.