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The AIJS is a judiciary reform initiative. The AIJS aims to centralise the appointment of judges at the extra district judge and district judge levels across all states.
Judges of the lower judiciary are planned to be recruited nationally and assigned to states like the Union Public Service Commission conducts a central recruiting procedure and allocates successful applicants to cadres.
The AIJS concept is now being presented in the context of judicial reforms to address persistent vacancies in the courts and case backlogs. The creation of AIJS is a welcome start, but it faces numerous constitutional and legal challenges.
AIJS’s Mission
The AIJS aims to establish an efficient subordinate judiciary, resolve structural concerns such as disparities in compensation and remuneration among states, fill vacancies quickly, and ensure consistent training across states.
Previous Proposal
The AIJS was first proposed in the 14th report of the Law Commission in 1958.
The notion of the formation of AIJS was opposed in the 1978 Law Commission report, which analysed case delays and arrears in lower courts.
Formation of AIJS
The formation of AIJS has a long and healthy heritage. The problem is amassing momentum because the central government finalises a Bill to set up a judicial provider at some point in India, a Bill that has stayed outside the history of the judicial reform debate for the past 65 years.
AIJS aims to establish a centralised cadre of district judges and to transfer the rights of hiring and appointing those judges from superior courts and national governments to a centralised community, similar to how different degree examinations are conducted throughout India. AIJS aims to help fill the current vacancies in the judiciary. The AIJS was first presented in the 14th report of the Law Commission of 1958. This paper prompted the formation of AIJS with a small element in its structure. They thought that the formation of the AIJS would attract the best talent in the country.
Need or Benefit from AIJS?
The formation of AIJS is to increase the number of younger judges appointed to the SC and HCs. In the current system, recruits serve as magistrates in the subordinate judiciary for at least ten years before becoming district judges.
According to a Law Commission assessment from 1987, India should have 50 judges per million people instead of 10.50 judges.’ Bottom-up’ recruiting would also address corruption and nepotism in the lower judiciary.
Overall Effectiveness
A well-organised judicial service can attract talent from our law schools, and youthful and knowledgeable judicial officers at the extra district judge level can make a difference. They can assist the court system by moving faster and more efficiently as DJs and district judges.
Arguments Against the AIJS
A centralised recruitment process is considered an affront to federalism and an incursion on the powers provided to states by the Constitution. The fight between the Centre and the State would begin.
The judiciary has fewer opportunities for advancement, promotion, and growth. The opposition also relies on the fundamental principle of separation of powers. A central exam might give the administration a foot in the door for district judge appointments, reducing the influence of the high courts in the process.
A broad mandate would necessitate significant changes to the Constitution, particularly in the selection process for the lower subordinate judges (that is, all ranks below that of a district judge).
The Way Forward
The unmanageable number of outstanding cases necessitates the construction of a recruitment system that recruits efficient judges in large numbers to expedite case disposition.
Despite these limits, the founding of AIJS aims to make a compelling case since if civil officials can learn the local language of the state in which they are posted, so can judicial officers. As a result, language should not be a barrier.
It is in everyone’s best interest for cases to be resolved as soon as feasible. If there are enough judges, they can only be made available through AIJS, as we see with the IAS, IPS, IFS, and other civil services. There should be no further delays.
Conclusion
In addition to considering an AIJS as a solution for judicial vacancies, it may be prudent to investigate the motivations and causes of a wide range of openings in underperforming states. Although the Supreme Court has requested AIJS twice, it faces obstacles from the executive branch and high courts.
As a result, AIJS aims to be constructed so that it overcomes its weaknesses and becomes a powerful tool for filling judicial vacancies. Adequate judges can be most useful if they are recruited in large numbers through the formation of AIJS, as we see with the IAS, IPS, IFS, and other civil offers. As a result, there should be no more delays. Furthermore, a judicial provider officer may receive sufficient schooling to address the task upon selection. A meritocratic judiciary is a pressing need that an active recruitment procedure can meet.
