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Not only do Pakistan and India share a 1610-kilometre border, languages, cuisines, dress codes, and cultures, but they also share the waters of six rivers: the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas, as well as their countless tributaries. The growing populations of both nations, as well as the resulting increased demand for water, have made transboundary water sharing more difficult.
In light of the changing environmental and social realities confronting water supplies, this study revisits the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between the governments of India and Pakistan. The analysis is carried out against the backdrop of recent developments in international water law with the goal of examining the IWT’s strengths and shortcomings and, as a result, proposing a future route for it.
Brief History:
The dispute arose when newly constituted countries (India and Pakistan) disagreed about how to share and administer what was essentially a cohesive and unitary irrigation network from the Indus River System. Pakistan saw the prospect of Indian dominance over the tributaries that carried water into the Pakistani portion of the basin as a threat to its survival. Whereas India had its own objectives for the profitable development of the basin, Pakistan saw a fight over the main source of water for its arable land as a grave threat. As a result, on September 19, 1960, in Karachi (Pakistan), the Indus Water Treaty was signed under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development currently known as World Bank.
Indus Water Treaty:
The treaty established and defined both countries’ rights and obligations regarding the usage of the Indus River system’s waters.
The treaty awarded Pakistan the waters of the western rivers, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, and India the waters of the eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. It also authorized the finance and construction of dams, connecting canals, barrages, and tube wells, most notably the Tarbela Dam on the Indus River and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River. These assisted in providing Pakistan with the quantity of water that it had previously received from the rivers now allotted to India’s exclusive use.
Use of IWT on Eastern rivers by India:
- India built the Bhakra Dam on the Satluj River, the Pong and Pandoh Dam on the Beas River, and the Thein (Ranjit Sagar Dam) on the Ravi River.
- With the help of projects such as the Beas-Sutlej Link, the Madhopur-Beas Link, the Indira Gandhi Nahar Project, and others, India uses practically all of the water in the Eastern rivers.
- India has taken efforts to halt the flow of water to Pakistan for its use, which belongs to India. These initiatives include the development of the Shahpur Kandi Project and the River Ugh Multipurpose Project. This is a national project that will take 6 years to complete from the start of execution.
Rising tensions between India and Pakistan due to IWT:
Water nationalism has been on the rise in India and Pakistan in recent years. The Salal dam problem arose in 1970 and was settled by the two countries in 1978. Pakistan has continued to oppose the construction of the KHEP in Kashmir. Despite Pakistan’s opposition, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated three units on May 19, 2018.
Fears of future water scarcity as a result of dam construction are increasing diplomatic problems between India and Pakistan. In India, a story about Pakistani-affiliated Islamic terror cells targeting civilians has been used to justify abandoning diplomacy and even threatening to cut off Pakistan’s water supply. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s nationalist media has blamed the country’s floods on India’s inadequate water management. This underlying distrust and suspicion between the two countries have also been utilized to incite anti-Indian sentiment in Pakistan.
Need to review IWT:
The IWT clearly spells out the rules for the use of surface water, but there is a large policy vacuum when it comes to groundwater management and governance. Despite the fact that the subject has been raised in a number of conversations involving the two countries’ governmental and scientific sectors, no collaborative approach has yet been adopted. Similarly, the treaty tends to ignore environmental and climatic considerations, the effects of which on the Indus Basin are rapidly becoming clear.
The IWT should take into account numerous environmental elements that could potentially affect water supply in India and Pakistan, given that per capita availability is declining in both countries.
The treaty has withstood major and minor setbacks; now is the moment to examine it and give it new energy by including topics such as groundwater as well as environmental and climate change in its scope. By adopting groundwater recharge programs and collaborative hydropower production projects, the two countries can develop a strong sub-regional hydro-economy through diplomatic endeavours.
Conclusion:
The IWT was meant to be a technical solution to the subcontinent’s political difficulties, but it is evident that only a political breakthrough will result in the necessary technical interventions. Certain treaty provisions enable the IWT to be modified or replaced.
